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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 11/07/2011

Accident number: 734

Accident time: 10:40

Accident Date: 15/06/2009

Where it occurred: Bagram Air Field
(BAF), Bagram District,
Parwan Province
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Afghanistan

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 18/08/2009

ID original source: None

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 11/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate survey (?)
use of pick (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
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The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

File date: 18th August 2009
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DEMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation was conducted by [Demining group] to find out the causes of demining
accident involving [the Victim] the de-miner of [Demining group] MDD1 team working in
Bagram Air Field (BAF). The accident occurred on 15 June 2009 at a minefield/fence inside
the BAF, Bagram district of Parwan province.
SUMMARY:
[Demining group] is subcontracted by US-DOD for mine clearance in Bagram Air Field. On 15
June 2009, when the [Demining group] US-DOD related team was working on a BAC task
inside the BAF, experienced an uncontrolled detonation. The accident happened when [the
Victim] the deminer was excavating a detected signal using a small pick; he found a metal
plate and decided to excavate beneath the metal plate, during the excavation drill his
excavation tool might touched the mine and caused it to go off.
The task was counted as a BAC task, the deminer [the Victim] was not taking due care and
worn the PPE and eye protective glass instead of full face protective visor. The use of lower
protection level caused injuries to the deminer’s face, but his eyes were remained safe. He
has also got some injuries on his hands and arm with broken bones.
CONCLUSIONS:
The main contributing factors to this accident were the assessment of mentioned area as a
BAC task and the carelessness of deminer, as he did not take due care during the excavation
drill and working without having a full face protective visor. When a sub-surface BAC search
is involved, then the full face protective visor with other elements of PPE should be worn
(AMAS 22.6.1.b).
RECOMMENDATIONS:
However, the [Demining group] has taken appropriate actions, but as a lessons learned the
following points are to be considered by all demining teams:
•

Full level of protection should be considered during the clearance operations both in
BAC sub-surface clearance and mine clearance activities.

•

The de-miners should not hurry up during the operations and be careful while
conducting investigation on any detected signals.

•

A comprehensive assessment, technical survey and planning for the clearance of
each single task should be conducted prior to commencement of clearance
operations.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 927

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron; goggles

Goggles

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: severe Arm; severe Face; severe Hands
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "injuries to the deminer's face, but his
eyes were remained safe.. "injuries on his hands and arm with broken bones".

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the
investigators found that the task had been wrongly assigned by survey and this error was not
corrected. Despite the fact the subsurface excavation of mines was taking place, the Victim
was permitted not to wear the approved PPE for demining. The secondary cause is listed as
Inadequate equipment because the use of a pick-axe to excavate a mine delicately is not
appropriate. The injuries included broken bones that probably resulted from the deminer
being struck by parts of the pick-axe.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The summary gives little detail and does not list the medical treatment or the
corrective measures taken by the demining group. The UN supported MACCA has failed to
make Board of Inquiry reports widely available for some years, so ignoring the requirements
of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have been more responsible over
this than those internationals who presume a greater responsibility.
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